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The Veterans' Preference Statutes: Do They Really
Discriminate Against Women?
I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,' upheld the constitutionality
of a state statute giving veterans a preference over non-veterans in
the procedure for selecting civil service employees. This decision
theoretically ends the controversy concerning veterans' preference
statutes and their impact upon the job-seeking endeavors of women.2
However, prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the three-judge
federal district panel hearing the case at the trial level had held that
the pervasive and disparate impact of the veterans' preference statute
discriminated against women in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.' Although it was in line with the trend
of increasing judicial sensitivity toward official sex discrimination,' the
federal court decision was inconsistent with prior and subsequent decisions in which courts have ruled that veterans' preference provisions
are permissible enactments of legislative policy.' Indeed, such statutes
have been accepted as matters of historical fact since some form of
1. 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (upheld absolute lifetime preference because there was no
showing of intent to discriminate).
2. There has been much scholarly concern with the constitutionality of preferring
veterans for public employment positions while ignoring the statistically substantiated
adverse impact upon women. See Blumberg, De Facto and De Jure Sex Discrimination
Under the Equal Protection Clause: A Reconsideration of the Veterans' Preference in
Public Employmen 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 3 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Blumberg]; Fleming
& Shanor, Veterans' Preferences in Public Employment. Unconstitutional Gender
Discrimination? 26 EMORY L.J. 13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Fleming & Shanor]; Comment, Veterans' Public Employment Preference as Sex Discrimination,90 HARV. L. REV.
805 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Veterans' Public Employment Preference].
3. Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976) (found violation of
equal protection clause where impact of the statute was to absolutely and permanently
deprive women of significant public employment opportunities).
4. Fleming & Shanor, supra note 2, at 14-15.
5. Cases decided prior to Anthony include Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252
(M.D. Pa. 1973) (upheld Pennsylvania's ten point bonus preference); Koelfgen v. Jackson,
355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), affd mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973) (upheld Minnesota's absolute preference for initial hiring and five point bonus preference for promotion). Cases
decided subsequent to Anthony included Bannerman v. Department of Youth Auth., 436
F. Supp. 1273 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (upheld California's ten point bonus preference); Branch v.
Du Bois, 418 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (upheld Illinois' point bonus preference formula
allowing seven-tenths of a point for each month, or portion thereof, of service); Ballou v.
State, Dep't of Civil Serv., 148 N.J. Super. 112, 372 A.2d 333 (App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 75
N.J. 365, 382 A.2d 1118 (1978) (upheld New Jersey's absolute preference).

Duquesne Law Review

Vo1.18:653

veterans' preference for public employment is utilized by the federal
government and by virtually all of our states." Thus, the effects of
veterans' preference provisions are felt throughout this country.
This comment will evaluate the constitutionality of veterans'
preference statutes when challenged by charges of sex discrimination
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' In doing so, the newly developing trend of handling subtle,
more sophisticated discrimination in facially neutral laws will be explored, with a focus upon the rivalry of intent versus impact as the
relevant test. To achieve this purpose, the comment will study and
analyze the Supreme Court's decision in Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, paying specific attention to the conflict between case law and scholarly viewpoints on sex-based challenges to
veterans' preference statutes.8
II.

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR OF MASSACHUSETTS V. FEENEY

A. ProceduralHistory
Helen B. Feeney, a female non-veteran, brought an action in 1975
challenging the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Veterans'
Preference Statute.9 That statute gives veterans who pass the civil
service test an absolute preference over non-veterans for ranking on
civil service eligibility lists. The top ranked applicants are then certified to an appointing agency, which chooses its employees from
among those so certified regardless of their relative test scores or
veteran status." Under the Massachusetts statute, there is no limit to
6. Fleming & Shanor, supra note 2, at 16-17 nn.12 & 13. They list forty states employing some type of bonus point system and seven states utilizing the preference in its
absolute form. Note also that the federal government and some of the states in the point
preference category do, to some degree, supplement their basic system with an absolute
preference for certain positions, for disabled veterans, or for both. Id. at 17 n.13.
7. It is useful to note at this point that veterans' preference provisions are
specifically excluded from challenge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). Section 712 of that statute provides that "[n]othing contained in this
subchapter shall be construed to repeal or modify any Federal, State, territorial or local
law creating special rights or preference for veterans." Id. § 20OO0e-11. See Fleming &
Shanor, supra note 2, at 15-16 n.9. See also 442 U.S. at 259 n.2.
8. See notes 2 & 5 supra.
9. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (West 1966).
10. Id. As long as the veteran passes the test, he is automatically placed at the top of
the eligible list, even ahead of non-veterans with far superior test scores. Actually, the
particular provisions of the statute dictate that those applicants who pass the test will be
placed on the eligible lists in the following order: (1) disabled veterans according to their
respective scores; (2) other veterans according to their respective scores; (3) widows of
veterans and widowed mothers of veterans according to their respective scores; (4) all
other applicants according to their respective scores. Id For a collection of early cases in-
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the number of times a veteran can exercise the preference, and he can
use it anytime during his lifetime."
Because of the operation of this statute, Feeney failed to obtain certification for several positions with the state government, despite the
adequacy of her test scores." Noting that a substantial number of
women lack veteran status, Feeney asserted that the preference provision has a disparate effect upon her and most of the commonwealth's
women in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.13
A divided three-judge federal district court ruled, in Anthony v.
Massachusetts, that the absolute and permanent nature of this
veterans' preference formula had a drastically negative impact upon
the opportunities of women to obtain significant civil service appointments, and, therefore, deprived them of the equal protection of law.'
validating statutes granting a preference to veterans regardless of whether they received
a passing grade or possessed the minimum qualifications necessary to the discharge of the
public duties involved, see Annot., 161 A.L.R. 494 (1946).
11. 442 U.S. at 261-62.
12. 415 F. Supp. at 492. Ms. Feeney applied for three different civil service positions
within the Division of Office Services. Each time she received a test score high enough to
be certified for the vacant position. Nonetheless, the operation of the statute caused her
to be ranked behind veterans, mostly male, who had predominantly lower scores.
13. Ms. Feeney claimed that there was a pattern of exclusion established by the
preference, which had a disparate impact not only upon her own job-seeking endeavors,
but also upon those of all the commonwealth's women. Statistics indicated that only one
and eight-tenths percent of female appointments to the Division of Office Services are
veterans. Id. at 488. The breakdown of the 47,005 total appointments in the Division of Office Services, where Feeney sought positions, for the ten year period from July 1, 1963, to
June 31, 1973, was as follows:
Male appointments
26,794
57% of all appointments
- veterans
14,476
54% of all male appointments
Female appointments
20,211
43% of all appointments
- veterans
374
1.8% of all female appointments
Furthermore, although forty-three percent of these civil service appointments were
females, a closer look indicates that they were mainly appointments to lower grade positions in which men were traditionally not interested. Id. Such statistics seem to have
reflected several federal statutes and regulations which limited the number of women who
can serve in the armed forces. Id. at 489. The fact that women are not drafted, in conjunction with past absolute percentage limitations and more stringent enlistment criteria, has
resulted in the situation where only two percent of Massachusetts' veterans are women.
Id. at 489-90. Thus, few women have qualified or will ever qualify to receive the
preference.
14. Id. at 499. Court of appeals Judge Campbell, in his concurring opinion, stated that
it is one thing to give veterans a head start, but quite another to give them an absolute
entitlement to the state's most desirable civil service positions. Thus, he opined, the
Massachusetts statute has gone too far-there are other less drastic means of aiding and
prefering veterans. Id. at 501 (Campbell, J., concurring).
District Judge Murray, however, refused to speculate regarding alternative means. He
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In focusing on the practical consequences of the scheme, 5 District
Judge Tauro, writing for the Anthony majority, observed that the
clear intent of the statute was to benefit veterans even at the expense
of women."6 Additionally, he noted that job-related criteria were
relegated to a secondary position 7 and that less drastic reasonable
alternatives were available to achieve the state's desired objective. 8
Thus, Judge Tauro ruled that although the goal of benefiting veterans
was a laudable one, 9 the means utilized were not sufficiently related to
that purpose."0
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,2' the judgment was
vacated and the case remanded22 for further consideration in light of
3
the Court's intervening decision in Washington v. Davis."
In Davis,
the Supreme Court had held that absent proof of discriminatory intent,
mere discriminatory impact alone is not sufficient to constitute a violation of the equal protection clause.2 Thus, while disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, intent to discriminate becomes the focal point of
an equal protection inquiry. 5
On remand, the same divided three-judge district panel again ruled
reasoned that courts should not inquire into the wisdom of legislative policy. According to
Judge Murray, the question was whether there is a demonstrable rational basis for the
classification. In his view, characterizing the absolute and permanent preference as being
too great was irrelevant to the question of constitutional permissibility. Thus, he rejected
the means/end calculus of the majority and would have held that the statute is neither
gender-based nor invidiously discriminatory against women. Id. at 501-07 (Murray, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. Id. at 497. The court stated that "[in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment,
'[tihe result and not the specific intent is what matters.'" Id.
16. Id. at 496.
17. Id. at 497.
18. Id. at 499.
19. Id. at 496.
20. Id. at 495.
21. There is a direct appeal by right to the United States Supreme Court from the
decision of a three-judge federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
22. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977) (per curiam).
23. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upheld the constitutionality of a facially neutral literacy test
administered by the District of Columbia police department as a prerequisite to employment).
24. Id. at 242.
25. Id. According to one author, this case attempts to clarify the apparent inconsistency between the impact and intent cases which previously coexisted in this area of
the law. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1031-32 (1978). Professor Tribe
points out that some Supreme Court decisions contradict each other by alternatively
stressing intent in one situation and impact in another. Id. at 1025-32. Compare Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (racial motivation was the crucial missing element) with
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (absence of a discriminatory effect offsets a clearly
discriminatory motive).
26. Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143 (1978).
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that neither Davis, nor the Supreme Court's opinion in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.," required
an alteration of their original decision in Anthony.28 The majority opinion, again written by District Judge Tauro, looked to the "totality of
relevant facts"' so as to make an inference of discriminatory intent in
satisfaction of the Davis requirement. Citing two concurring opinions
of Justice Stevens,2 the majority stressed the "natural, foreseeable
and inevitable" consequences of the statute when considered in conjunction with the federal military scheme. 1 Since they assumed that
the legislature was aware of the restrictive federal military regulations and could easily have foreseen the inevitable discriminatory effect of the preference," the panel majority treated such impact as one
of the factors relevant to a showing of discriminatory intent." In conjunction with this foreseeability test, the court pointed to available
statistical evidence in order to find a clear pattern of women being excluded from competitive civil service positions.' In light of these two
factors, the majority concluded that the requirement of discriminatory
3 5
intent had been satisfied.
27. 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (denial of application for rezoning to build racially integrated,
low and moderate income housing was not a violation of equal protection since there was
no proof that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor).
28. 451 F. Supp. at 144.
29. Id. at 147. The Supreme Court in Davis indicated that intent can be shown by
reference to all of the relevant facts and circumstances, one of which was discriminatory
impact. 426 U.S. at 242. Arlington Heights expanded upon this by listing other relevant
factors: the historical background of the decision, the prior sequence of events, the departure from normal procedures, and the contemporaneous statements of the decisionmakers.
This was not intended or considered, however, to be an exhaustive summary. 429 U.S. at
266-68.
30. 451 F. Supp. at 146-47.
31. Id. at 147-48. The majority wrote: "In practical application, the combination of
federal military enrollment regulations with the Veterans' Preference is a one-two punch
that absolutely and permanently forecloses, on average, 98% of this state's women from
obtaining significant civil service appointments." Id. at 148 (quoting from Anthony, 415 F.
Supp. at 498) (emphasis added). See also note 13 supra.
32. 451 F. Supp. at 148. The court implicitly based this upon the tort concept that an
actor is presumed to know and to intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of his
actions. See W. PROSSER. LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 8A (1965).
33. 451 F. Supp. at 147 n.7. See also note 29 supra.
34. See notes 13 & 31 supra.
35. 451 F. Supp. at 150. Further, the court factually distinguished Davis from
Feeney, focusing upon the commonwealth's failure to make affirmative efforts to recruit
minorities, the lack of a relationship between the preference and job qualifications, and
the lack of facial neutrality. According to Judge Tauro, these factors, which were not present in Davis, are among those relevant to making an inference of discriminatory intent.
Id. at 149 n.15 (absence of efforts to recruit minorities); id. at 148 (lack of relationship); id.
at 147 n.7 (lack of neutrality).
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The majority then determined that the laudable end of benefiting
veterans did not justify the means-an intentional subordination of
women in their attempts to secure desirable public employment.36
Again noting the availability of less drastic means to attain the purpose of aiding veterans, including a bonus point system or a time
limitation provision, 7 the court held that the legislature made a "constitutionally impermissible value judgement." Therefore, the Feeney
majority concluded that its prior decision of unconstitutionality in Anthony was correct, despite the subsequent Supreme Court remand. 8
The case was again appealed to the Supreme Court and this time a
substantial decision was rendered.

36. Id. at 149-50.
37. Id at 150. The majority cited its previous decision in Anthony which suggested
two alternatives-namely, giving veterans a fixed number of bonus points, or limiting the
period within which a veteran can exercise his preference. The bonus point system and
the time limitation were considered reasonable ways to aid veterans, which would not absolutely and permanently disadvantage women. Id at 499.
38. In a brief concurring opinion, Judge Campbell recognized the disparate impact of
the law, yet noted the persuasiveness of the argument that the statute was neutral on its
face and was not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. He reasoned, however, that the
neutrality of the statute and its lack of discriminatory motive were rendered illusory by
the "inevitability of exclusionary impact" which affords women no opportunity to correct
the situation. He stated that the cost of benefiting veterans is being disproportionately
borne by women. Thus, he concluded that although Davis and its progeny required the acceptance of unequal impact in some salutary programs, to accept such grossly disparate
and inevitable consequences as "neutral" and "unintended" would render the equal protection clause a mere "hollow pretense." Id. at 150 (Campbell, J., concurring).
In a strong dissent, Judge Murray determined that the statute was neither genderbased nor intentionally discriminatory. He posited that the statutory classification was
neutral with merely the effects of its operation being uneven. To illustrate the statute's
neutral operation, he pointed out that a substantial number of male non-veterans share
the disfavor of the statute along with female non-veterans. In addition, he noted that a
small number of women do acquire the benefit of the statute. Thus, he concluded that it
was erroneous to categorize the statute as facially non-neutral. Id. at 152-53 (Murray, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, he found the majority's analysis insufficient to make an inference of
legislative intent. In his opinion, the purpose of the legislature was not to harm women,
but rather to aid veterans. Furthermore, Judge Murray noted that there was a lack of
proof that the classification was a "mere pretext" to accomplish an invidiously
discriminatory purpose. Thus, he determined that the majority's finding of discriminatory
intent was likewise mistaken. Id. at 155-56 (Murray, J., dissenting). For him the only difference between Davis and Feeney was that the Massachusetts statute had a greater impact upon the relevant group. Indicating that impact alone is not determinative, Judge
Murray asserted that the majority's attempts to distinguish Feeney from Davis were
fruitless. Since, in his analysis, Ms. Feeney had failed to prove discriminatory intent,
Judge Murray concluded that the statute was constitutional. Id. at 153-55 (Murray, J.,
dissenting).
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The Supreme Court's Decision

In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 9 the
Supreme Court finally put an end to its long volley with the
Massachusetts district court panel. In reversing and remanding the
latest district court judgment, the Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had not violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment when it granted an absolute
lifetime preference to veterans. Although noting the standardized rationale in support of veterans' preference statutes, 0 the Court determined that "any state law overtly or covertly designed to prefer males
over females in public employment would require an exceedingly persuasive justification."41 A caveat, however, was added that the equal
protection clause is the guarantor of equal laws, not equal results. 2
Thus, the Court embarked upon a two-fold inquiry: (1) whether the
classification is either overtly or covertly gender-based, and (2)
whether the statute reflects invidious gender-based discrimination. 3
The first question was somewhat easy for the Court. Using the factual findings made, by the district court, that the statute served
legitimate ends and was not established for the purpose of
39. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Justice Stevens wrote a short concurring opinion to make one
major point that he felt was dispositive: the number of males disadvantaged by the
statute (1,867,000) was sufficiently large and sufficiently close to the comparable number
of females (2,954,000) to refute the claim of a gender-biased intent. Id. at 281 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Marshall dissented from the majority's conclusion that purposeful
gender-based discrimination was not shown. Although the statute may have been passed
with an intent to benefit veterans, Justice Marshall reasoned that an intent to disadvantage women had an appreciable role in motivating the passage of the statute. He opined
that the impact of the statute was so disproportionate as to warrant a shift of the burden
to the commonwealth to affirmatively show the absence of sex-based considerations in the
decisionmaking process. Since Justice Marshall deemed the statutory classification both
overinclusive and not carefully tuned to alternative considerations, he concluded that the
classification was not substantially related to important governmental objectives, and
hence, was unconstitutional. Id. at 282-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 265 & n.12. Among those listed were: (1) rewarding veterans for past services, (2) easing the veteran's transition to civilian life, (3) encouraging patriotic service by
providing an incentive for entering, and (4) attracting loyal and well-disciplined people to
public employment. Id. (citing cases, an article and an annotation). It should be noted,
however, that although the Court cited Professor Blumberg's article, it is not clear that
Professor Blumberg does, in fact, accept such justifications as being adequate rationales
for upholding absolute lifetime preferences. See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 68-73.
41. 442 U.S. at 273. This is how the Court paraphrased its standard for sex
discrimination cases as prescribed under Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidated a statute forbidding the sale of beer to males under twenty-one and females
under eighteen). See also notes 60-61 infra.

42. 442 U.S. at 273.
43.

Id at 274.
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discriminating against women, Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, determined that the distinction between veterans and nonveterans was not a "mere pretext" for gender-based discrimination."
In fact, he reasoned that since some women share in the benefit of the
statute and many men are disadvantaged by the statute, it is not a law
that can be rationally explained as a gender-based classification: the
distinction is simply based upon the presence or absence of veteran
status.'"
The second question, involving invidious gender-based discrimination, was more complex, and the Court dealt with it in terms of two of
the plaintiff's contentions. The first of these was that the statute
favoring veterans should be viewed in conjunction with assertedly
discriminatory federal laws which severely curtail the opportunities of
women to become veterans.'" Justice Stewart rejected this argument
on three grounds: first, it contradicted the district court finding that
the statute was not passed for a discriminatory purpose; second, it
was irreconcilable with the district court's assumption that a less
severe preference for veterans would be acceptable;" and third, it
mistakenly presumed that the past discrimination of women in the
military was at issue in Feeney."9
The Court dealt next with Feeney's second contention that the
adverse impact upon women was a natural, foreseeable, and inevitable
consequence of the legislative policy, and that such adverse impact
should therefore be presumed to have been known and intended by the
legislature." This argument was also rejected by Justice Stewart. He
reasoned that "discriminatory purpose" requires more than intent as
volition or awareness of consequences: it requires that a certain policy

44.

Id. at 274-75. This was the argument made by the district court in attempting to

utilize the door left open by Davis and Arlington Heights. 451 F. Supp. at 148-50. See
Veterans' Public Employment Preference, supra note 2, at 809 (Davis left open the ques-

tion of whether disproportionate impact can be conclusive evidence of intent).
45. 442 U.S. at 275. See also id at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring) (since number of
males disadvantaged is sufficiently large and sufficiently close to number of disadvantaged
females, claim of intent to benefit males over females is refuted).
46. Id. at 276. Basically, this argument maintains that although the statute is not
itself gender-based, it intentionally incorporates federal military policies which are
gender-based and, therefore, should be treated as being gender-based. Id. See also
Blumberg, supra note 2, at 46, 51 ("relation back" argument); Fleming & Shanor, supra
note 2, at 26 (pool of eligible veterans becomes pool of eligibles consisting of not more
than three percent females).
47. 442 U.S. at 276.
48. Id. at 277 & n.23.
49. Id. at 277-78. Contra, Blumberg, supra note 2,at 46 ("[p]reference ought not to be
viewed in vitro").

50.

442 U.S. at 278. See also note 32 supra.
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be advanced "because of" and not "in spite of' its impact upon the
relevant group."' Thus, the Feeney majority concluded that because
the classification of veterans and non-veterans was neither overtly nor
covertly gender-based, and since the goal of benefiting veterans is a
worthy one, the veterans' preference statute must be accepted as any
other neutral law which has a greater adverse impact upon women
than upon men.52 Stating that it is beyond the scope of the judiciary to
smooth out the uneven effects of unwise legislative policies, the majority concluded that the lack of any showing of discriminatory purpose
put the statute within constitutionally permissible boundaries.
III.

THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF EQUAL PROTECTION
REVIEW FOR GENDER-BASED CHALLENGES TO
VETERANS' PREFERENCE STATUTES

A.

HistoricalBackground

The historical development of equal protection doctrine provides
valuable insight into a proper understanding of the significance of Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney. In the doctrine's
timid and precarious origin," the only requirement was that courts be
able to conceive of a rational basis for differentiating between similarly situated individuals." The doctrine was later molded into an interventionist sword with which the Warren Court carved out its high
ideals:' when government action created or affected a suspect class, or
impinged upon a fundamental interest, a strict scrutiny standard was
applied which called for the state to show a compelling interest for the

51. 442 U.S. at 279-80.
52. Id The Court recognized that the natural, foreseeable and inevitable consequences of a facially neutral law raises a strong inference that the adverse effects were
intended. The Court, however, also noted that "an inference is a working tool, not a
synonym for proof." Id at 279 n.25. In certain circumstances the inference simply does not
ripen into proof. Id
53. Justice Holmes called it "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). See also Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 380 (1949) ("where the clause is held to govern, its application
is halting, indecisive and unpredictable") [hereinafter cited as Tussman & tenBroek].
54. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, note 53 supra. Historically, this standard
was easily satisfied. In fact, frequently the only basis required for gender-based classifications was a stereotypical notion about a woman's role in society: "The paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This
is the law of the Creator." Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley,
J., concurring) (upheld a state rule of court forbidding women to practice law).
55. See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term--Forward: ConstitutionalAdjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966) ("[ojnce loosed, the idea of
Equality is not easily cabined") [hereinafter cited as Cox].
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classification it established;" in other cases, involving no suspect
classification or fundamental interest, the rational basis test was utilized.
The Burger Court, however, has recast the sword of intervention
into a staff of moderation by implicitly refusing to make further extensions of the strict scrutiny standard into the fringe areas that the Warren Court had not yet reached."7 But in striking a balance between
judicial activism and virtually complete legislative deference," the
Court has now developed an intermediate standard of review for certain "quasi-suspect" 9 classifications such as sex. 0 Essentially, this
standard requires a close and substantial relation between the
statutory classification and an important governmental interest. 1 In
Craig v. Boren82 this intermediate standard was applied to a classifica56. See Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1087-1133 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments).

57. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 48 (1972) (equal protection as "the preferred ground for intervention by a less interventionist Court") [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
58. See Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee:Prohibited, Neutral and Permissive Classifications,62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1092-94
(1974) (intermediate standard of review for "neutral classifications" so as to reconcile the
extreme nature of the strict two-tier approach) [hereinafter cited as Nowak).
59. Fleming & Shanor, supra note 2, at 36.
60. Under this standard, "aclassification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that persons similarly circumstanced should be treated alike." Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76, (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)). See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidated social security
benefits for widows, but not for widowers of deceased insured workers); Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (upheld military regulation allowing promotion of men after
shorter periods of service than required of women); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(upheld exclusion of pregnancy from state insurance program); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974) (upheld tax exemption for widows but not for widowers). But see Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality of court held sex to be a suspect classification
and so invalidated a presumption of dependency for service person's wife but not for husband). The explicit recognition of this intermediate standard for gender-based classifications was articulated in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), which invalidated a statute
forbidding the sale of beer to males under the age of twenty-one and females under the
age of eighteen.
61. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). After the Craig decision, the old rational
basis test had a "new bite," Gunther, supra note 57, at 20, and stereotypical attitudes
about the woman's role in society were no longer sufficient, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
7, 14 (1975). Compare this view with the early attitude cited in note 54 supra. One writer,
however, feels that in actual application this standard is not much different from the
strict scrutiny standard of review. Perry, Modern Equal Protection"A Conceptualization
and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1055 (1979) (difference is "more rhetorical than
real") [hereinafter cited as Modern Equal Protection].
62. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
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tion which made a distinction expressly on the basis of gender. The
Supreme Court had the opportunity in Feeney" to expand upon the application of its newly created intermediate standard by merging it with
the precedent dealing with facially neutral classifications." However,
since the Court did not find sufficient evidence of a covert classification, a heightened scrutiny standard of review was not employed."
Nevertheless, after Feeney, it seems clear that in a proper case this
extension of the application of the intermediate standard of review will
be made for challenges to facially neutral policies on the basis of sex."
The Feeney decision theoretically provides another avenue of attaining a heightened scrutiny standard of review for covert classifications
based on sex. It did for sex discrimination what Davis did for racial
discrimination. This background should be kept in mind as the intricacies of Feeney and the intent requirement are explored.
B.

The Intermediate Standard of Review and the
Davis Test

In order to apply the intermediate standard for sex discrimination
claims, the classification in question must either deal expressly in
terms of gender, or must be intended to distinguish between men and
women despite its apparent neutrality." These are alternative methods
of triggering a heightened scrutiny standard of review." If neither of
these alternative triggering requirements are met, the rational basis
standard of review must be applied to the classification of veterans
and non-veterans."9
Basically, this is the position advanced by the Supreme Court in
0
However, the Feeney opinion confuses the matter when it exFeeney."
plains its two-fold inquiry for a facially neutral statute,7 which is actually a three-pronged attack for an allegedly gender-based statute;
that is, (1) whether the statute is explicitly gender-based, (2) whether

63. 442 U.S. at 272-73.
64. See notes 23-25, 27 & 29 and accompanying text supra.
65. 442 U.S. at 274-75.
66. Had the Court in Feeney made a finding of "discriminatory purpose," an intermediate standard of review would have been applied. In two recent school desegregation cases, the Court held that the Davis test was satisfied. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979).
67. Blumberg, supra, note 2, at 35-51 ("Alternative Paths to a Heightened Standard
of Equal Protection Review").
68.

Id.

69.
70.
71.

See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
442 U.S. at 272-73. See also note 41 and accompanying text supra.
442 U.S. at 274. See also text accompanying note 43 supra.
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the statute is covertly gender-based, and (3) whether the statute is invidiously (purposefully, but not expressly) gender-based. To state each
of the segments in this manner is to make it quite clear that the second and third parts are merely two ways of saying the same thing!"
Also, the Court failed to explain clearly that obtaining an affirmative
answer to any one of these questions does not automatically result in a
violation of the equal protection clause, but instead triggers the implementation of a stricter scrutiny standard against which the statute
will be weighed." There is, however, some early authority for the proposition that once a "discriminatory purpose" is shown, the statute is
ipso facto unconstitutional.' At the time this theory was advanced, the
term "discriminatory purpose" had an entirely different meaning: the
connotation was that of a malicious type of purpose having no relation
whatsoever to any type of legitimate justification."5 Thus, the Court
made an unfortunate choice of words in Davis when it labeled its new
test "discriminatory purpose."" This has not only prompted the Court
7
to undertake a clarification of the doctrine on several occasions, but
has also caused scholars to expect the Court's continued invocation of
its power of judicial review to elucidate further the types of factual
situations in which an inference of intent is appropriate."
72. Purposefully making a non-explicit gender-based classification is the equivalent of
creating a statutory classification which is covertly gender-based. See Justice Stevens'
concurring opinion in Feeney in which he states: "If a classification is not overtly based on
gender, I am inclined to believe the question of whether it is covertly gender-based is the
same as the question whether its adverse effects reflect invidious gender-based
discrimination." 442 U.S. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Note, Discriminatory
Purpose and DisproportionateImpact: An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REv.
1376, 1390 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Assessment After Feeney].
73. Blumberg, supra note 2, at 35-51. See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra. It
should be noted that the presence or absence of a sufficient relationship between the purpose of a law and its classification is the heart of an equal protection inquiry. See generally
Tussman & tenBroek, note 53 supra. Although the Court's language appears to be clear
when it states the applicable legal precedent, the Court on the same page quotes a decision in which it was stated that "purposeful discrimination is 'the condition that offends
the Constitution.'" 442 U.S. at 274. This gives the mistaken impression that once purposeful discrimination is shown, unconstitutionality results.
74. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 53, at 366.
75. Id. at 358.
76. According to one scholar, "[tihe 'discriminatory purpose' terminology used in
Washington and elsewhere, however, is misleading . . . 'discriminatory purpose' refers to
the deliberate use by government of race as a criterion of selection; if this use is to be
sustained it requires a compelling objective that cannot be achieved without the racial
criterion." Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination,125 U.
PA. L. REv. 540, 548-49 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DisproportionateImpact Theory].
77. See notes 166-172 and accompanying text infra.
78. See Assessment After Feeney, supra note 72, at 1402 ("actual clarification of the
concept may be possible only through the Court's application of its powers of review to
varying fact situations").
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The present state of affairs is that commentators have criticized the
approach taken by the Supreme Court in its recent equal protection
decisions"9 for not following through with the Warren Court's" original
.'principle of moral equality."8 1 These commentators have read the
Supreme Court's definition of "discriminatory purpose" literally as a
"but for" causal link between an intent, which has been defined as
"animus" or "desire to harm," and the disproportionate impact of the
proferred policy.8 The result has been a scholarly quest for a more
flexible and realistic approach.' One proposal is that a balancing process be utilized in an attempt to show a probability that the decisionmaker's actions have been motivated by racial or gender bias." Under
this approach, the extent and severity of the disproportionate effect is
weighed against the importance of the legitimate purposes for the decision to the decisionmakers themselves. 8 However, this weighing process is strikingly similar to that employed by the equal protection doctrine in general, which measures the relationship between the imposed
classification and the legitimate governmental objective."
A categorization of the traditional equal protection doctrine into its
several component parts may clarify the above criticism of a balancing
approach to the Davis intent requirement, and thus render a better
perspective for handling the Court's new use of the term
"discriminatory purpose." The first component is "discriminatory purpose" in its old "malicious purpose" sense.87 If this factor can be shown,
the statute can be struck down as having an illicit objective: specifically, that the proferred state interest is illegitimate." Next is the notion of "classification," which involves the different treatment of
similarly situated individuals." Any system of classification, express or
implied, necessarily involves "discrimination" between one group or
another." But whether a classification is considered to be a "rational
discernment" between groups of individuals or an "unlawful
discrimination" of one group of individuals over another is dependent
79. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
81. Modern Equal Protection, supra note 61, at 1042. See also Assessment After
Feeney, supra note 72, at 1397-99.
82. Assessment After Feeney, supra, note 72, at 1397.
83. Id. at 1385; Modern Equal Protection, supra note 61, at 1040.
84. Assessment After Feeney, supra note 72, at 1407.
85. Id at 1408. Thus, the key to his thesis is "relative degree of impact." Id at 1410.
86. The degree of "rationality" required differs according to which standard of
review is applied. See notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
88. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 53, at 366.
89. Id. at 344.
90. Id at 358 n.35 (explains two senses of the term "discrimination").
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upon the final component of the equal protection doctrine, which can
best be described as the "balancing segment." The pertinent inquiry in
this segment is whether there is some type 9 of rational relationship
between the classification, be it express or implied, and the legitimate
state interest effectuated by the classification.9" If such a rational relationship exists, the policy withstands constitutional review and the
equal protection inquiry is over.
Thus, this review of the component parts in a traditional equal protection inquiry indicates that the suggested proposal to weigh the extent and severity of the statute's disproportionate effect against the
importance of its legitimate purpose confuses the "classification segment" with the "balancing segment." According to Davis, the term
"discriminatory purpose" is not intended to mean a malicious desire to
harm, but rather triggers a heightened scrutiny for facially neutral
laws, which is not a proper part of the traditional balancing segment.
In essence, the Davis Court requires a showing of "discriminatory purpose" to determine whether or not a cov ert classification is made along
suspect lines despite the apparent neutrality of the express classifications." In this regard, the Davis test is more properly considered part
of the classification component mentioned above. This indicates that
the Supreme Court's new use of the term "discriminatory purpose"
means something less than the malicious desire to do harm, because
this is encompassed in the first segment.9" This explanation illustrates
the incongruity of applying a weighing approach to ascertain
"discriminatory purpose," because weighing should occur only in the
final segment of an equal protection inquiry. The proposed balancing
test would "weigh" at the middle stage so as to trigger a stricter
balancing test in the final stage. This bootstrapping process undermines the classification stage of the equal protection doctrine and effects a virtual circumvention of the intent requirement. 9
In short, the Davis intent requirement is basically a matter of
classification, and should be treated as such. If the overt classification
is the one being challenged, then the weighing segment should be ap91. See notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the standards of
equal protection review and the varying degrees of relation required.
92. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 53, at 344-53.
93. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
94. 442 U.S. at 272-75.
95. The proposed balancing method confuses the "classification" and "balancing"
segments of equal protection inquiries. This may be the result of the short-lived marriage
of the equal protection clause and the Title VII impact standard under Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Under the Griggs standard, all that need be shown is a
statistically proven disproportionate impact. See notes 120-124 and accompanying text infra. Thus, intent and classification problems were effectively avoided.
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plied without the use of Davis." However, if a covert classification is
being alleged, then the Davis test must be satisfied; otherwise the express classification will be the one used in the balancing segment. 7
Finally, if the Davis test has been met for an alleged covert classification, then the covert classification should be analyzed in the balancing
segment of the equal protection doctrine. 8 This becomes the salient
point when the covert classification calls for a stricter standard of
review than does the overt one."
C.

Supreme Court vs. Academia: Application of the Davis
Test to the Veterans' Preference Statutes

Prior to the Feeney decision, there existed several divergent views
as to how the courts should apply the equal protection clause when
handling sex discrimination challenges to a veterans' preference
statute.' 6 The conflict basically came down to the judges.. versus the
scholars."0 2 The Massachusetts district panel's decisions, once in Anthony °3 and again in Feeney,"' were the first judicial decisions which
gave credence to these scholarly commentaries on the subject. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed these lower court decisions in
Feeney, thus siding with a majority of its brethren in rejecting sexbased challenges to veterans' statutes.
In determining the constitutional propriety of veterans' preference
statutes, it is necessary to consider the pertinent arguments raised on
both sides of the controversy. Such a consideration involves essentially
three questions. First, it is necessary to determine whether an overtly
gender-based classification is created by veterans' preference statutes.
The second inquiry focuses upon whether a gender-based classification
is covertly made by the preference statutes. The final determinaton,

96. The Davis test is only required for laws which are neutral on their face. 426 U.S.
at 242.
97. 442 U.S. at 278-80. As stated in Feeney, "the law remains what it purports to be:
a preference for veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex, not for men over
women." Id at 280 (emphasis added).
98. See text accompanying notes 91 & 92 supra.
99. Id. Once the Davis test is met, the covert classification is used. Nonetheless, if
the classification does not involve a fundamental interest, a suspect class or a quasisuspect class, the rational basis test will be applied to the covert classification regardless
of the showing of intent. See generally Blumberg, supra note 2, at 35-51. See also notes
53-66 and accompanying text supra.
100. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
101. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
102. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
103. 415 F. Supp. 485. See notes 16-22 and accompanying text supra.
104. 451 F. Supp. 143. See notes 26-38 and accompanying text supra.
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which is totally dependent upon the resolution of the first two inquiries, requires the formulation of the appropriate standard of review
to be applied to the classification.
1.

Overt Gender-Based Classification

When a veterans' preference statute is challenged on the basis of an
alleged discrimination against women, it must be considered facially
neutral because it does not expressly employ a gender-based classification. However, if the same statute were challenged on the basis of nonveteran status, it would not be considered facially neutral since there
now exists an express classification on the asserted basis of discrimination. 0 5 This results in the same statute being treated as facially neutral
in one context and as expressly "discriminatory" ' in the other. The
purpose of this part of the inquiry is to ascertain whether there is an
express classification on an asserted basis which would trigger a
heightened scrutiny standard of review. °7 Thus, if there is an overt
gender-based classification, an intermediate standard of review would
be applied. However, if the overt classification deals only in terms of
veteran status, the rational basis test must be applied absent some
showing of a covert gender-based classification. The applicable equal
protection standard of review is, therefore, dependent upon the
asserted challenge, and it becomes important to initially determine
whether or not the statute is neutral on its face.
The more specific question in the veterans' preference context is
whether or not the statute can be considered gender-based because it
gives a benefit to veterans, a group which is predominantly male, but
excludes non-veterans, a group which is comprised of both males and
females. Clearly, this classification deals expressly in terms of veteran
status alone."' However, the argument has been made that the
veterans' preference classification should be "related back" to
assertedly discriminatory federal military regulations.'
By incorporating a set of criteria which excludes such a great number of
women, the statute is said to be overtly gender-based and not neutral
on its face."0 It is, however, improper to consider the discriminatory ef105. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (challenge by conscientious objector who performed alternative service); Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1974)
(challenge by policemen and firemen).
106. "Discriminatory" in the sense that all classifications discriminate between certain
groups of individuals. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 53, at 358 n.35. See note 90 and
accompanying text supra.
107. 442 U.S. at 271-73. See also Blumberg, supra note 2, at 35-51.
108. 442 U.S. at 276.
109. See 451 F. Supp. at 147 & n.7; 415 F. Supp. at 489-90.
110. Professor Blumberg wrote: "The preference ought not to be viewed in vitro but
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fects of federal military regulations while at the same time refusing to
consider their corresponding justifications."' In any event, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the policies of the federal government toward allowing women to serve in the armed forces are not in
question in the veterans' preference situation. "2
Moreover, the discriminatory proscription procedures in the federal
system imposed a burden, not a benefit upon men.' In order to
alleviate the burden of both compulsory and voluntary military service, virtually all of our states allocate an offsetting benefit through
various forms of statutes giving preference to veterans in public
employment."' That this is a laudable goal is beyond dispute."5 Therefore,
these considerations, when viewed in conjunction with recent decisions
holding such preferences to be neutral on their face,"' lead to the conclusion that it is inappropriate to label such veterans' preference
statutes as gender-based." 7
should instead be related back to the civil service applicant's capacity to acquire the qualifying criterion -military service sufficient to warrant the preference." Blumberg, supra
note 2, at 46. See also Fleming & Shanor, supra note 2, at 26.
111. Blumberg argues that the discriminatory effects of federal military regulations
should be considered in an attempt to show that the statute created a gender-based
classification. She feels, however, that a cordon sanitaire should be drawn around the corresponding justifications for such a federal policy in order to prevent their use in support
of a state preference. Blumberg, supra note 2, at 51. The inconsistency of such a view is
apparent. If an attack is going to be made upon the discriminatory effects of the statute
caused by the federal military policies, consistency requires one to also consider their concomitant justifications. Nevertheless, the better position is to take the federal military
regulations as a given neutral factor, since the states are not responsible for the acts of the
federal government. See, e.g., Branch v. Du Bois, 418 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Il1. 1976) (upheld
point bonus system of Illinois).
112. 442 U.S. at 276-78.
113. Presumably people do not care to be drafted. Contra, Blumberg, supra note 2, at
46-47 n.247 (benefit of not being subject to draft is "of questionable value when so many
job, health, and welfare benefits hinge upon service").
114. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
115. See 442 U.S. at 265 & n.12. Even Professor Blumberg considers public jobs to be
a limited state resource which may be distributed in a manner calculated to achieve a
variety of social goals. Blumberg, supra note 2, at 30.
116. See 442 U.S. at 274; Bannerman v. Department of Youth Auth., 436 F. Supp. 1273
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (upheld point bonus preference); Branch v. Du Bois, 418 F. Supp. 1128
(N.D. Ill. 1976) (upheld point bonus system); Ballou v. State, Dep't of Civil Serv., 148 N.J.
Super. 112, 372 A.2d 333 (App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 75 N.J. 365, 382 A.2d 1118 (1978) (upheld
absolute preference).
117. The relation back argument really goes to the issue of covert gender-based
discrimination; it should not be considered in the initial inquiry to determine whether
there is an overtly gender-based classification. See 442 U.S. at 276-78. This determination
is mainly a factual conclusion, made solely on the basis of the presence or absence of an
express classification on the asserted basis of discrimination. The proponents of this argument, however, put it forward at this stage of the inquiry and, therefore, it has been
similarly dealt with here.
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Intent to Discriminate: Covert Gender-Based Classification

Since veterans' preference statutes are not overtly gender-based, a
second inquiry must be made to determine whether or not there is a
covert distinction on the asserted basis of discrimination. It is in connection with this issue that the Davis decision becomes important. In
order to show covert discrimination, impact alone is not enough; there
must be a showing of a purpose to discriminate on the asserted basis."8
If intent or purpose can be shown, the intended distinction is then
treated as if it were an overt classification. For example, if the covert
classification involves a suspect classification, such as race, or a fundamental interest, such as voting, the strict scrutiny standard of
review should be applied. Also, if the covert classification involves a
quasi-suspect classification such as gender, the intermediate standard
of review should be applied. However, if the covert classification does
not involve any of these triggering factors, the rational basis standard
of review should be applied, regardless of the showing of
discriminatory purpose. Thus, discriminatory purpose becomes the
equivalent substitute for an express classification, and the same standards of review that are applicable to express classifications are also
applied to those that are intended but not expressed." 9
In considering the issue of discriminatory intent, some background
is required. In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 20 interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act' as prohibiting not
only intentional discrimination, but also the discriminatory impact of
facially neutral employment practices. Although later cases
acknowledged this statutory prohibition against employment practices
Also, in Feeney, Justice Campbell's concurring opinion made a similar argument for a
gender-based classification because the impact of the statute was the same as if it were
gender-based. 451 F. Supp. at 152 (Campbell, J., concurring). This is not enough to show
an overt gender-based classification. It is simply an attempt to avoid the motive requirement that Davis set for facially neutral laws. Because Davis held that impact alone is not
determinative, this argument attempts to circumvent the Davis holding by bootstrapping.
It uses impact to argue gender-based classification so that the Davis decision will be inapplicable and thus impact will again become determinative. Nonetheless, the question is far
simpler than all this. In the veterans' preference situation we have an express classification
dealing only in terms of veteran status, not gender. This is all that need be said in the
first part of the inquiry. On this basis, it can be concluded that an overtly gender-based
classification is not created by veterans' preference statutes.
118. See notes,23-25 and accompanying text supra.
119. See notes 96-99 and accompanying text supra.
120. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employer's practice of requiring successful job applicants to
have high school diploma or to achieve a minimum score on intelligence test, which had a
disparate impact upon minority applicants, violates Title VII unless employer is able to
demonstrate that those requirements are job-related).
121. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976).
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and applied 'it in an equal protection context," Davis has expressly rejected this approach. Davis maintains that the Title VII statutory
standard is totally distinct from equal protection doctrine, which requires that a discriminatory purpose be shown before a facially neutral
policy will be struck down."2 3 Thus, in relying upon an impact analysis,
the district court majority in Anthony gave credence to what is now
generally considered to be bad case law.'
Presently, when courts are faced with a challenge to a facially
neutral law, they must either make an inference of intent or render a
decision upholding the constitutionality of such statutes.'2 5 In infering
the presence of discriminatory intent, the lower court in Feeney held
that the statistics evidenced a systematic exclusion of women.2 6 For
two reasons, this systematic exclusion argument is inapposite in the
veterans' preference situation and was, therefore, properly considered
not to be determinative by the Supreme Court in Feeney. 7 First of all,
a showing that as little as two percent of women in the Civil Service
are veterans'28 does not warrant the conclusion that women are being
substantially deprived of positions by virtue of the preference.'2 A
comparison to the relevant applicant pool or at least to the number of
women in the state's workforce would more accurately reflect proportions of the actual number of people similarly situated with respect to
the purpose of the lawln-the actual number of people ready, willing
and able to fill the vacant positions.
122. Blumberg, supra note 2, at 21-35. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
123. 426 U.S. at 244 & n.12. The Davis Court wrote: "We have never held that the
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so today." Id. at
239.
124. The Anthony court cited two of these impact cases with approval. 415 F. Supp. at
497. See Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 910 (1975); Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972). Both of these cases applied the Griggs Title VII impact standard in an equal protection context. The Beecher
case even cited Griggs. See generally Fleming & Shanor, supra note 2, at 23 nn.33 & 34;
Veterans' Public Employment Preference, supra note 2, at 809 n.42.
125. In Feeney,.the three-judge Massachusetts district panel made an inference of intent. 451 F. Supp. at 149. The Supreme Court reversed, however, and upheld the statute.
442 U.S. at 281.
126. 451 F. Supp. at 149.
127. 442 U.S. at 274-75.
128. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
129. Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (upheld Pennsylvania's ten
point bonus preference despite a showing of statistics very similar to those of
Massachusetts: two percent of women in Civil Service were veterans, thirty-five percent
of males in Civil Service were veterans, and forty-eight percent of the total civil service
workers were women). Compare these statistics with those cited in note 13 supra.
130. See note 141 and accompanying text infra.
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Furthermore, District Judge Murray made a good point in his dissent to the Feeney majority when he noted that both men and women
share the benefit of the statute.131 Indeed, the converse is also true: a
large number of men also share the disfavor of the statute. ' Thus, the
statistics are not of sufficient magnitude to be considered determinative," especially when such a high level of exclusion is required to
infer intent. 3 "
Even assuming that a proper showing of systematic exclusion has
been made, the argument is inapplicable for a second reason. The pattern must not be explainable on grounds other than gender."
However, the veterans' preference is explainable on other grounds: it
draws a distinction between veterans and non-veterans regardless of
their sex. 3 ' The characteristic of being a veteran is what determines
inclusion within the preferred class." 7 Hence, the right to recover must
rest upon the plaintiff's membership in the non-veteran class, not in
the subcategory of women.' In spite of this, comparisons are con131. 451 F. Supp. at 152-53 (Murray, J., dissenting).
132. Id. In Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Feeney, the determinative factor
was that the number of males disadvantaged by the statute (1,867,000) was sufficiently
large and sufficiently close to the corresponding number of females (2,954,000). See note
41 supra.
133. Some commentators argue that Davis left open the question of whether a
disproportionate impact can be conclusive evidence of intent. See Veterans' Public
Employment Preference, supra note 2, at 809. See also note 44 and accompanying text
supra. However, the Court in Arlington Heights indicated that "such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the court must look to other evidence." 429 U.S. at 266 (footnote omitted).
See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (required only that the asserted classification not be a "mere pretext" for invidious sex discrimination).
134. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (facially neutral law applied in
discriminatory manner). In Yick Wo, not only were most of the brick laundries owned by
Caucasians and most of the wooden ones owned by Chinese, but also, all Chinese owners
of wooden laundries were refused licenses while only rarely were such licenses refused
to Caucasians. Id. at 361-62. See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (racial gerrymandering along city boundaries in a highly extraordinary shape so as to exclude all
but four or five of the city's previous four-hundred black voters).
135. 442 U.S. at 276-78. Davis hints at this by stating that "in various circumstances
the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." 426 U.S. at 242. The
Court in Arlington Heights, however, plainly stated that "a clear pattern, unexplainable
on grounds other than race" is prohibited. 429 U.S. at 266. See also Casteneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482 (1977) (explanation on neutral grounds would have rebutted statistical
evidence showing exclusion of Mexican-Americans from juries).
136. 442 U.S. at 276-78. See also Ballou v. State, Dep't of Civil Serv., 148 N.J. Super.
112, 125, 372 A.2d 333, 339 (App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 75 N.J. 365, 382 A.2d 1118 (1978) (the
veterans' preference laws do not make any distinction based on sex).
137. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 53, at 344-45, for the traditional definition of
"classification." See also notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra.
138. Ballou v. State, Dep't of Civil Serv., 148 N.J. Super. 112, 125, 372 A.2d 333, 339
(App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 75 N.J. 365, 382 A.2d 118 (1978).
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tinually being made between veterans and non-veteran women. 3"
However, the proper analysis, as reflected in recent cases, is that the
attendant impact falls upon all non-veterans, male and female alike." '
The accuracy of this view is easily seen when one reverts to traditional equal protection doctrine which focuses upon the different treatment of persons who are "similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.""' Since the purpose of this statute is to aid
veterans,"2 all veterans should be treated similarly. The same should
be done with all non-veterans. Since there is a lack of identity between
the classification and gender, the relevant comparison to be made in
considering the constitutionality of the statute is between the
classifications of all veterans and all non-veterans."" Hence, if a nonveteran is alleging an equal protection violation, he/she must make a
showing that he/she has been treated differently than other nonveterans."'
One commentator has disagreed with this type of analysis, attacking
the reasoning of Koelfgen v. Jackson"' by postulating that the relevant
139. See, e.g., Fleming & Shanor, supra note 2, at 50; Blumberg, supra note 2, at 59;
Veterans' Public Employment Preference, supra note 2, at 806.
140. See cases cited at note 116 supra. See also Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252
(M.D. Pa. 1973) (upholding Pennyslvania's ten point preference); Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355
F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973) (upholding Minnesota's absolute preference for initial appointment and five point bonus preference for promotions).
141. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 53, at 246; Developments, supra note 56, at
1076-82. See also the Reed line of cases listed in note 60 supra.
142. 442 U.S. at 264-65.
143. See note 149 inf!ra.
144. In 1974, the Supreme Court held that a conscientious objector's claim for relief
had to be based on his membership in the class of non-veterans, and not on the
subclassification of conscientious objectors. Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 404-06
(1974) (challenge to federal statute affording benefits to veterans). The analogous relationship between Johnson and a veterans' preference sex challenge is apparent. In fact, since
the conscientious objector provides substitutive civilian service, he has a stronger argument for being similarly situated with veterans. That is, they have both performed some
type of service for the government. Despite this fact, the conscientious objector still lost.
Nevertheless, attempts have been made to distinguish Johnson from the gender situation.
See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 46-47 n.247 (women never asked to be exempted but conscientious objectors did); Fleming & Shanor, supra note 2, at 61 n.218 (federal government's justification of special interest in defense and maintenance of armed forces is not
available for the acts of state legislatures). Although such distinctions are questionable,
the hypothetical situation of a flat-footed plaintiff effectively avoids Professor Blumberg's
contention, while Mr. Fleming's and Professor Shanor's contention is put to rest by the
previously mentioned notion that the states do have a valid interest in aiding their
veterans and, therefore, need not attempt to adopt rationales of the federal government.
442 U.S. at 274-78.
145. 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973) (upheld absolute
preference for hiring and point system for subsequent promotions).
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comparison should be between veterans and female non-veterans. 4 '
The following analogy may indicate why this position is not convincing.14 If a person with flat feet were to challenge a state's
veterans' preference statute, it would not. be appropriate to compare
the "non-veteran" subclassification of "flat-footed people" with the major classification of "veterans." Clearly, it would be incorrect to do so
since the subclassification of "flat-footed people" does not include all
persons similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.'48 So,
just as flat-footed people must be considered as part of the larger class
of non-veterans, so must women. 49 Actually, since there are no flatfooted veterans, the argument on behalf of flat-footed people would be
even stronger than that for women, because the "veteran" class would
include some females but would not include any individuals with flat
feet. "' Thus, the systematic exclusion argument is not sufficient to
raise an inference of discriminatory intent: the veterans' preference
classification is not a mere pretext for "invidious" sex discrimination. 5 1
A second argument utilizing statistical evidence can be made to
meet the Davis requirement. It has been argued that the natural,
foreseeable and inevitable consequences of the statute are relevant factors toward raising an inference of discriminatory intent.5 ' An old line
of cases held that disproportionate impact, regardless of discriminatory
intent, is the crucial factor in deciding equal protection challenges. 3
146. Blumberg, supra note 2, at 58-59. Analyzing Koelfgen, Professor Blumberg wrote:
By subsuming female non-veterans in the class of all non-veterans, the court avoided any consideration of the sexual-impact issue. It is desirable, therefore, to pose
squarely the question of sexual impact by presenting a woman plaintiff deprived by
the operation of the preference of a job opportunity she would otherwise have had,
and by confining the class she represents to similarly situated female non-veterans.
Id at 59.
147. Professor Blumberg, as well as Mr. Fleming and Professor Shanor, contend that
the remedy of making the preference available to all non-veterans would result in a
"windfall" benefit to male non-veterans. The theoretical nature of this problem may be
another indication that their asserted classifications are incorrect. See Blumberg, supra
note 2, at 74; Fleming & Shanor, supra note 2, at 50.
148. See notes 141-144 and accompanying text supra.
149. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In holding that the exclusion of
pregnancy from the California disability insurance program was not invidious sex
discrimination denying women equal protection of the law, the court noted that although
the class of pregnant people is exclusively female, the second group of non-pregnant persons includes members of both sexes. This was said to illustrate lack of identity between
gender and the statutory classification. Id. at 495 n.19.
150. Id. at 495.
151. 442 U.S. at 274-75. See note 133 supra.
152. 451 F. Supp. at 147. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
153. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (since there was no racially
discriminatory impact, the decision to close public pools rather than desegregate was
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These decisions were later used as authority for reading a "natural
and foreseeable consequences" test into the requirement of
discriminatory intent."4 Apparently, Justice Stevens advanced this
5
to which the lower court
in Davis,"'
position in his concurring opinion
5
1
subscribed.'
had
in Feeney
Now, however, Davis has virtually overruled' 7 the original impact
cases,' 58 and doubt has been cast upon the viability of this entire line of
development.'59 Nevertheless, a few courts continued to use a showing
of natural and foreseeable consequences to raise a presumption of
discriminatory intent which shifts the burden of persuasion to the
defendant. This then became conclusive proof of intent unless there
was an affirmative showing by the defendant that the policy was of
neutral motive.' ° Other courts, like the lower court in Feeney, used
the test as a factor in determining the presence or absence of intent.''
This was more in line with Davis and Arlington Heights, since those
decisions stressed the totality of relevant facts.' Hence, after handing
down its decision in Davis, the Supreme Court summarily vacated and
remanded for reconsideration several cases in which lower courts had
applied the presumption,' 3 even though some of those cases involved
upheld despite the existence of discriminatory motive). See also Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (division of school district had the effect of interfering with an
outstanding order of a federal court). See generally Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 150 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
154. Arthur v. Nyquist, 429 F. Supp. 206, 210 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 573 F.2d 134
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978). See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd. of
Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508
F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
155. Justice Stevens opined that "[f]requently the most probative evidence of intent
will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the
subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended
the natural consequences of his deeds." Davis, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring).
156. 451 F. Supp. at 146-47.
157. 426 U.S. 245 n.12.
158. See note 153 supra.
159. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 429 F. Supp. at 210 nn.3 & 4.
160. See, e.g., United States v. School Dist., 541 F.2d 708, 709 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated
and remanded, 433 U.S. 667 (1977).
161. 451 F. Supp. at 147 n.7.
162. Arthur v. Nyquist, 429 F. Supp. at 210-11 & n.4. See also note 29 and accompanying text supra.
163. See School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (per curiam) (vacated and
remanded the lower court's holding that the natural and foreseeable consequences of
racial imbalance in the school system gives rise to a presumption of segregative intent,
which is conclusive if not rebutted); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977)
(vacated and remanded a lower court's finding of a "cumulative violation" of the equal protection clause based on several factors indicating segregative impact on the Dayton school
system); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.)
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situations where the disparate consequences were natural, foreseeable
and inevitable."' 4 However, lower federal courts persisted in clinging to
the presumption for making findings of discriminatory intent.'65 This
necessitated further action by the Supreme Court in Feeney, where
the Court stated that foreseeability of consequences creates a "strong
inference" of discriminatory intent, but should not be used as a
"synonym for proof."'66 Although this language is not as strong as the
language used previously," 7 it is apparent that the Court will not accept such evidence as conclusive on the issue of intent.
Nevertheless, subsequent to its Feeney decision, the Supreme Court
again broached the issue of discriminatory intent, this time in the context of two school desegregation disputes. In Columbus Board of
Education v. Penick' and Dayton Board of Eduction v. Brinkman,'6 9
the Court upheld the imposition of systemwide school desegregation
plans on the basis of a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of
the two school districts involved. 7 ' The Court was persuaded that the
requisite discriminatory intent was present in both cases, basing its
conclusion upon an examination of all of the relevant factors
surrounding the operation of the school systems, which significantly included a history of past segregative conduct and a showing that the
impact of such conduct and policies was actually being exacerbated
rather than abated. 7' The rationale which had been applied by the
courts of appeals in Columbus and Dayton indicated that these courts
were still applying a presumption standard in determining whether

(vacated and remanded in light of Davis the district court's holding that segregation was
the "natural, foreseeable and inevitable result" of the school district's policy of assigning
students to schools closest to their homes). See also NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559
F.2d 1042, 1046 & n.2, 1047-48 (6th Cir. 1977) (remand in Austin signals rejection of the effect approach and affirmance of the de jure approach). For a federal court decision rejecting the foreseeability test as determinative of intent, see United States v. Chicago, 549
F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1978) (police department's
awareness of racially disproportionate impact of exams is not a showing of intent under
Davis).
164. This was the case in Austin, 429 U.S. 990. See note 163 supra.
165. See, e.g., Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d at 142-43 (view that presumption remains
valid after Davis, Arlington Heights and Austin) (citing Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of
Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974)); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 599 F.2d 1042,
1046-47 (6th Cir. 1977) (quoting Oliver). See cases cited at note 154 supra.
166. 442 U.S. at 279 n.25.
167. The Court in the Davis and Arlington Heights decisions spoke of factors and circumstances relevant to a showing of intent. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
168. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979).
169. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979).
170. Columbus, 99 S. Ct. at 2949-50; Dayton 99 S. Ct. at 2980-81.
171. Columbus, 99 S. Ct. at 2948; Dayton, 99 S. Ct. at 2981.
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discriminatory intent was present.'72 Although the Supreme Court
upheld the conclusions of the lower courts as to whether discriminatory intent existed, the Court again tried to end the presumption debate by reiterating its position that a showing of natural and
foreseeable consequences is only one factor relevant to raising an inference of intent, and does not automatically create a "prima facie case
of purposeful racial discrimination." '
The different results in Columbus and Dayton on the one hand, and
Feeney on the other, are justifiable because the fact situations are
distinguishable. In Columbus and Dayton there was a finding of a past
history of discriminatory intent and an affirmative duty to eliminate
the discriminatory effects of such past practices.'74 All that is present
in the typical veterans' preference situation, as was present in Feeney,
is a statistical showing of disparate impact and a finding that this was
a foreseeable consequence of the decision to enact the statute.' The
Supreme Court has expressly stated that proof of disparate impact and
foreseeable consequences is not a sufficient showing of discriminatory
intent to satisfy Davis.'8
Therefore, although the Massachusetts district panel in Feeney
stated that it was looking to the totality of relevant facts so as to raise
an inference of intent,'177 in reality it continued to follow an Anthony172. Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 787, 802-04 (6th Cir. 1978), affd, 99 S.
Ct. 2941 (1979) (affirmance of district court's decision which arguably used the presumption). See Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 253-54 n.3. (S.D. Ohio 1977).
See also Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1978) (expressly used the
presumption).
173. Dayton, 99 S. Ct. at 2978 n.9. The Court wrote as follows:
We have never held that as a general proposition the foreseeability of segregative
consequences makes out a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination and
shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendants if they are to escape
judgment; and even more clearly there is no warrant in our cases for holding that
such foreseeability routinely shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendants. Of
course, as we hold in Columbus today .. .proof of foreseeable consequences is one
type of quite relevant evidence of racially discriminatory purpose, and it may itself
show a failure to fulfill the duty to eradicate the consequences of prior purposefully
discriminatory conduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
The various concurring and dissenting opinions in these two cases criticize the decisions
of the majorities for their use of presumptions, affirmative duty, causality and
foreseeability. See, e.g., Columbus, 99 S. Ct. at 2952 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Dayton, 99
S. Ct. at 2981 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Columbus and Dayton, 99 S. Ct. at 2989 (Powell,
J., dissenting). The authors of these opinions apparently feel that the distinction between
de facto and de jure desegregation is being obscured by the majority's approach.
174. See note 171 and accompanying text supra.
175. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
176. Columbus, 99 S. Ct. at 2950.
177. 451 F. Supp. at 147. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
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type impact analysis. 178 A new twist was added, however, by stacking
one statistical impact argument upon another, thus attempting to
camouflage a virtual reiteration of the Anthony decision. However,
such a "cumulative violation" argument was implicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court in Feeney, 7 and was expressly rejected in Columbus.'
Since neither the systematic exclusion argument nor the foreseeable
consequences argument is individually sufficient to raise an inference
of intent, the inference should not be made when they are considered
together.'' This being so, the Davis test of invidious discrimination has
not been met. Absent a gender-based classification or a showing of
discriminatory intent, the intermediate standard of review for quasisuspect classifications cannot be applied. Thus, by process of elimination, the rational basis standard of review is the only viable alternative
for dealing with challenges to veterans' preference statutes on the
basis of gender.
3. The Rational Basis Standard Applied: The Balancing Segment of
Equal Protection Review
In the veterans' preference context once covert gender-based
discrimination has been shown, the classification is treated as one
which distinguishes between men and women. However, if intent cannot be established to show a covert gender-based classification, the
distinction made is simply between veterans and non-veterans
regardless of their gender." 2 Because the asserted basis of discrimina178. See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra.
179. See 442 U.S. 256 (1979). See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406
(1977); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046 n.2 (6th Cir. 1977).
180. 99 S. Ct. at 2950 ("disparate impact and foreseeable consequences, without more,
do not establish a constitutional violation").
181. Id. The statistical argument about a clear pattern of exclusion is unconvincing.
See notes 126-134 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, it states only half of the
standard. A further showing that the pattern is unexplainable on other, nondiscriminatory grounds, is required. See notes 135-151 and accompanying text supra. The
contention that the "natural, foreseeable and inevitable consequences" of the statute
result in discrimination, in conjunction with the statute's disproportionate impact, is not a
sufficient showing of discriminatory intent to constitute an equal protection violation
under Davis. See notes 152-180 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, Davis is not
distinguishable. It was easily foreseeable that blacks would not do as well as whites on
the test. 451 F. Supp. at 153 (Murray, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP
v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) (expert
testimony that black and Spanish-surnamed candidates performed poorly on written multiple choice exams). Likewise, the legislature's awareness of the consequences does not
satisfy the intent requirement. 451 F. Supp. at 153 (Murray, J., dissenting). Thus, we have
two separate impact arguments which do not amount to a showing of intent.
182. 442 U.S. at 276, 278-80.
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tion has not been proven either overtly, through an express genderbased classification, or covertly, through a purpose to discriminate
against women, the female non-veteran plaintiff has no special status
to challenge the statute. Her claim must therefore be treated as that
of any other non-veteran challenging the classification between
veterans and non-veterans under the rational basis standard of
review.183
Using the proper, "permissive" standard of review,'" a court could
easily conceive of a rational basis to relate the statutory classifications
of veterans and non-veterans to the governmental interest of aiding
veterans. 5 Absent a strict scrutiny standard, the legislature is
presumed to have acted constitutionally'86 and invidious discriminatory
purpose will not be lightly inferred.'87 The courts will not inquire into
the wisdom of legislative policies and will only consider whether the
statute falls within constitutionally permissible boundaries.' This is
the meager role of the judiciary in the lower tier of equal protection
doctrine. To strike down veterans' preference statutes in the face of a
sex-based challenge would be to unjustifiably "cross the Rubicon," for arbitrariness and capriciousness are not in sight. 89
In both Anthony and Feeney the Massachusetts district court panel
highlighted the availability of less drastic reasonable alternatives, such
as a point preference for acheiving the legitimate objective of aiding
veterans.'O It was the absolute and permanent nature of the
preference which was said to render the Massachusetts statute constitutionally objectionable, although a point preference or time limit
would have been acceptable. 9' In actuality, this is merely another
impact-type argument which is not determinative unless other factors

183. See notes 97 & 119 and accompanying text supra.
184. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
185. The rationales in support of veterans' preference provisions have been standardized and are well accepted. 442 U.S. at 265 & n.12. See also cases cited in note 87 supra.
186. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (upheld
statute setting fifty as mandatory retirement age for uniformed police officers).
187. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (no equal protection violation merely because classifications are imperfect).
188. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 (1974) (upheld statute granting an annual
property tax exclusion to widows, but not to widowers).
189. Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329, 335 (5th Cir. 1974) (court upheld veterans'
preference under rational basis test, stating that "our constitutional 'thou shall not' is
most limited: we may cross the Rubicon only to search out capriciousness and arbitrariness").
190. 415 F. Supp. at 499; 451 F. Supp. at 150. See also 442 U.S. at 281-82 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
191. 415 F. Supp. at 499. See also note 31 supra.
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are present to indicate discriminatory intent. 92' Consequently, the
Supreme Court has held that the degree of the preference makes no
constitutional difference, and that less drastic reasonable alternatives
have no role in the rational basis standard of review.'93 Thus, since the
classification of veterans and non-veterans reasonably relates to the
purpose of aiding veterans, veterans' preference statutes pass constitutional muster regardless of the availability of other reasonable alternatives. 9 "
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has indicated that a veterans' preference
statute should be considered neutral on its face when it is challenged
192. 415 F. Supp. at 507 (Murray, J., dissenting) (just another way of saying preference was too great, not that there was no rational basis for the classification); Koelfgen
v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 254 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973) (the difference is in degree rather than principle); Ballou v. State Dep't of Civil Serv., 148 N.J.
Super. 112, 124, 372 A.2d 333 (App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 75 N.J. 375, 382 A.2d 1118 (1978)
(availability of less drastic means is irrelevant and immaterial). See also Blumberg, supra
note 2, at 80 ("to say ... that a point system would be less onerous ... is not a constitutionally adequate reason"). In response to the Feeney majority's argument that a point
system is acceptable, but an absolute one is not, Judge Murray's dissenting opinion illustrated how the point preference system would also have kept Ms. Feeney from becoming certified. 451 F. Supp. at 509 n.14. (Murray, J., dissenting). Without a gender-based
classification or factors indicating intent, the intermediate standard of review should not
be applied to our veterans' preference situation. See note 67 and accompanying text
supra. Absent this heightened scrutiny, the availability of less drastic alternatives is
meaningless. See Developments, supra note 56, at 1102 n.154 (strict scrutiny requires the
use of less onerous alternatives); Blumberg, supra note 2, at 23 n.114 (strict scrutiny requires that less drastic means not be available). It is, therefore, interesting to note that
Judge Campbell's concurring opinion in Anthony was based solely on this point! 415 F.
Supp. 501 (Campbell, J., concurring). See note 14 supra.
193. 442 U.S. at 277 & n.23.
194. Contra, Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall felt
that the intermediate standard of review should be applied to veterans' preference
statutes. Id. at 282-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He then concluded that there is not a
substantial relation between the classification and the three state interests involved. Id.
at 286-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting). More specifically, he determined (1) that the classification was overinclusive when gauging its relation to the state interest in easing veterans
back to civilian life because the statute invokes a permanent preference; (2) that the
statute was overinclusive when gauging its relation to the state interest of encouraging
military service because the statute extends benefits to veterans who had already served
during a prior period, and because it benefited men who were drafted as well as those
who served voluntarily; (3) that the statute was not "carefully tuned to alternative considerations" when gauging its relation to the state interest of rewarding veterans. Id.
Although Justice Marshall's points arguably present a closer question when applying the
intermediate standard of review, it would nevertheless appear that such close scrutiny is
not required under the rational basis standard of review. See notes 53, 54, & 184-194 and
accompanying text supra.
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for allegedly violating the equal protection rights of women.' 0 From
this conclusion, it follows that the requirement of showing a
discriminatory purpose is applicable 90 and must be satisfied in order 1to97
utilize the heightened scrutiny standard for sex-based classification.
19
systematic exclusion'99 and
However, the theories of "relation back,""
foreseeable consequences'" do not afford the courts a sufficient foundation upon which to base an inference of intent."' In addition,
arguments concerning the availability of less drastic alternatives,
which focus on the absolute and permanent nature of some preference
provisions such as the one in Massachusetts, are similarly of no help." 2
Although such statutes may have a disparate effect upon a state's
population, a typical veterans' preference statute is neutral on its face,
is not motivated by any discriminatory purpose, and should therefore
be upheld under a rational basis standard of review. 3
Previously, there was a great deal of debate about the propriety of
inquiring into the subjective motivation of decisionmakers when considering contitutional questions. 4 However, the Supreme Court has
foreclosed such discussion with its decisons in Davis, Arlington
Heights, and now Feeney.0° Yet, Davis and Arlington Heights only
dealt with the constitutionality of administrative actions.' In Feeney,
the Court was faced with the much more difficult question of dealing
with the subjective motivation of an entire state legislature. It is one
thing to determine the subjective motivation of a single administrator
or even a small group of administrators, but it is quite a different matter to attempt to gauge the subjective motivation of several hundred
195.
196.

See notes 109-117 and accompanying text supra.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See text accompanying note 117 supra.

197.
198.
199.
200.

See
See
See
See

201.

See note 181 supra.

202.
203.

See notes 190-194 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 182-194 and accompanying text supra.

note 73 and accompanying text supra.
notes 109-117 and accompanying text supra.
notes 126-151 and accompanying text supra.
notes 152-180 and accompanying text supra.

204. Compare Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212-17 (1970) ("The Case Against Considering Motivation") and Cox,

supra note 55, at 116 ("lilt seems unlikely that much constitutional significance will attach
to distinctions in terms of intent") with Brest, Palmer v. Thompson" An Approach to the
Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95, 134 ("a blanket

refusal to inquire into legislative and administrative motivation is not justified").
205.

See Modern Equal Protection, supra note 61, at 1039 ("whatever the particular

structure of inquiry into motivation adopted by the Court, it is clear that the Court
should not and does not forsake the inquiry"). See also Columbus, 99 S. Ct. 2941; Dayton,
99 S.Ct. 2971.
206. In Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), it was a qualifying test by a police department, and
in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), it was the denial of an application for rezoning.
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legislators."' Thus, although the Supreme Court had previously made
discriminatory intent the focal point for alleged equal protection violations concerning administrative acts,"'8 it has, by virtue of its Feeney
decision, implicitly extended the application of the intent requirement
into the area of legislative enactments.
The significance, then, of Feeney is in the lesson that the Supreme
Court is determined to stand by its earlier mandate set forth in Davis,
even for the more difficult question of legislative motivation. However,
the Supreme Court will probably find it necessary to continue to expound upon its controversial Davis test in order for that test to attain
its proper role in equal protection inquiries.0 9 It is suggested that the
Court would do well in this area of law by avoiding its terminology
quandary"' and thinking more in terms of mere pretext and covert
classifications."' The showing of an intentional covert classification will
then presumably be more difficult than intent in the tort sense of volition or knowledge of the consequences, but it will be easier than the
showing of a motive to cause harm."1 ' But, as the Davis test stands
now, challenges by plaintiffs such as Helen Feeney will be unsuccessful
unless future courts are willing to conclude that legislatures had an improper desire to disadvantage women which in turn motivated the
enactment of a veterans' preference statute."' It is predicted that this
will occur on rare occasion, if at all. Perhaps in this respect, and for
this moment in time, the idea of equality has been cabined."1'
Pat Labbadia, III
207. Branch v. Du Bois, 418 F. Supp. 1128, 1133 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (intent of a
legislature is much more difficult to ascertain than the intent of an individual, with which
both courts and juries are more accustomed to dealing). See also Tussman & tenBroek,
supra note 53, at 359; Assessment After Feeney, supra note 72, at 1405 & n.190.
208. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
209. See notes 78 & 80 and accompanying text supra.
210. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
211. See notes 87-99 and accompanying text supra.
212. See De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965
(1979), where the court stated:
The search for sex-discriminatory motivation cannot halt simply upon a
demonstrated absence of manifest misogyny. On the other hand, it would be inappropriate and unwise for the courts to attempt to probe the thought processes of
every decision-maker with legislative or administrative responsibilities for traces of
sexual bias.
Id. at 59.
213. See Rhode Island Minority Caucus, Inc. v. Baronian, 590 F.2d 372, 376 (1st Cir.
1979) (necessary to prove that "racial animus" played a part in the decision in order to
trigger strict scrutiny). See also note 82 and accompanying text supra.
214. But see Cox, supra note 55, at 91 ("[o]nce loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily
cabined").

